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ADDENDUM 
This Commentary was written prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision on January 25, 2016.  In our Commentary, we distilled the 
Supreme Court’s decision to a choice between two general holdings: 
(1) FERC cannot regulate the retail market, and any regulation of 
demand response amounts to exactly that; or (2) the agency has 
authority to impact behavior in the retail market, so long as it acts 
within the wholesale market.  As we expected, the Supreme Court 
held (6-2) in favor of the latter, upholding FERC’s jurisdiction over 
wholesale demand response, regardless of any incidental impact on 
the retail market.1 
The Court considered two issues: whether FERC was authorized 
to regulate demand response at all, and whether the order  was 
arbitrary and capricious. On the latter issue, the court merely 
exercises deference to FERC’s rate-setting power; it refuses to 
reconsider FERC’s conclusion.2  The jurisdictional question offers a 
more interesting analysis.  The majority opinion reaches the 
conclusion that FERC had authority to act in three steps. 
First, the Court confirms the expansive effect of § 206 on FERC’s 
jurisdiction.  As we discuss in Section II-C of our Commentary, § 206 
expands FERC’s jurisdiction because the language “practices . . . 
affecting [wholesale] rates” is necessarily broader than “wholesale 
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 1.  See FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n., 577 U. S. __, 33–34 (2016) (“FERC’s 
statutory authority extends to the Rule at issue here addressing wholesale demand response . . . .  
And although (inevitably) influencing the retail market too, the Rule does not intrude on the 
States’ power to regulate retail sales.“). 
 2.  See id. at 30 (“Our important but limited role is to ensure that the Commission 
engaged in reasoned decisionmaking . . . .  FERC satisfied that standard.”). 
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rates” alone.3  The Court now adopts the “common-sense” limitation 
that FERC’s “affecting” jurisdiction is limited to rules or practices 
that “directly affect the [whole-sale] rate,” but this statutory 
interpretation provides enough room for FERC to issue Order 745 
because wholesale demand response “is all about reducing wholesale 
rates.”4 
Interestingly, the majority sidesteps the issue of how much 
deference should be afforded to agencies in interpreting their own 
jurisdiction.5  In our analysis, we anticipated the jurisdictional 
deference question to be more significant, but the Court instead holds 
that the FPA unambiguously grants authority to FERC.6 
Second, the Court addresses the federalist claim that any 
jurisdiction FERC may have is ultimately limited by the States’ 
exclusive authority to regulate retail sales.  The majority agrees that 
the FPA does reserve some exclusive authority for States.7  Where, 
however, FERC “affects” retail sales through its oversight of 
wholesale transactions, it has not intruded State authority.8 
The Court characterizes wholesale demand response as “a 
practice directly affecting wholesale electricity rates,” which 
“(inevitably) influenc[es] the retail market too.”9  Although it does 
not say so explicitly, the Court’s understanding of demand response 
aligns with FERC’s.10  The Court’s adoption of FERC’s view is directly 
opposed to the D.C. Circuit’s derision of FERC’s characterizations as 
 
 3.  See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 281–82 (1976) (“The rules, 
practices, or contracts ‘affecting’ the jurisdictional rate are not themselves limited to the 
jurisdictional context.”). 
 4.  Electric Power Supply Ass’n., 577 U. S. __ at 15 (quoting California Independent 
System Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F. 3d 395, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). 
 5.  See id. at 14 n.5 (“Because we think FERC’s authority clear, we need not address the 
Government’s alternative contention that FERC’s interpretation of the statute is entitled to 
deference.”). 
 6.  Id.  
 7.  See id. at 17–18 (explaining that were FERC to issue an order that “specifies terms of 
sale at retail,” then “the regulation would exceed FERC’s authority” since regulation of retail 
sales “is a job for the States alone”). 
 8.  See id. at 18 (“Yet a FERC regulation does not run afoul of §824(b)’s proscription just 
because it affects—even substantially—the quantity or terms of retail sales.”). 
 9.  Id. at 34. 
 10.  See Electric Power Supply Assn., 577 U. S. ____ at 17 (“Compensation for demand 
response thus directly affects wholesale prices.  Indeed, it is hard to think of a practice that does 
so more.”) 
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“creative” and “metaphysical.”11  It is unclear the extent to which the 
Court is agreeing with FERC or deferring to its expertise. 
Finally, the Court adds that FPA’s purpose is to “eliminate 
vacuums of authority over the electricity markets.”12  If FERC has no 
authority over wholesale demand response, then no one would, 
creating exactly to sort of vacuum the FPA was intended to 
eliminate.13 
The Court concludes that the FPA was intended to close 
regulatory vacuums by drawing from legislative history.  As we discuss 
in Section II-A of our Commentary, the Act was passed to close the 
Attleboro Gap.  The Court refuses to accept that Congress would 
intend the reservation of State authority to create a new gap in 
demand response. 
Overall, the Court held that both the plain text and legislative 
purpose of the FPA unambiguously grant FERC the authority it 
needs to regulate wholesale demand response.  Deference did not 
play as large a role in determining the jurisdiction question as we 
anticipated, although it is unclear whether it might have were the 
Court’s view not in line with FERC’s.  The opinion is significant for its 
broad delineation of federal regulatory authority in the energy 
industry rather than for any clarification on how much deference to 
afford regulatory agencies in determining their own jurisdiction. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the consolidated case of FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n 
and EnerNOC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n,14 the Supreme Court 
will decide whether the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) has the authority to regulate the developing demand 
response market. The case raises two core issues: (1) what is the reach 
of FERC’s jurisdiction, particularly as it relates to traditional state 
authority over the retail energy market, and (2) to what extent is 
demand response a fiction used to create a loophole through which 
FERC can regulate the price of electricity paid by consumers? The 
 
 11.  See Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 221, 223 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(explaining that FERC’s distinction between wholesale and retail demand response was 
“metaphysical” and jurisdictional bounds cannot be circumvented through FERC’s “creative 
characterizations”). 
 12.  See Electric Power Supply Ass’n., 577 U. S. ____ at 2–3 (discussing the Attleboro Gap). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  135 S. Ct. 2049 (2015). 
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Supreme Court will make one of two possible determinations. The 
first possibility is that the Court will agree with the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals and the Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA) that 
FERC cannot regulate the retail market, and any regulation of 
demand response amounts to exactly that. The second possibility is 
that the Court will agree with FERC and EnerNOC that the agency 
indeed has authority to incentivize behavior in the retail market so 
long as it acts within the wholesale market, which the regulation is 
specifically tailored to do. The argument explicated in what follows is 
that the Court should overturn the D.C. Circuit and defer to the 
agency’s characterization of demand response, thereby placing 
wholesale demand response resources under FERC’s jurisdiction. 
 
I.  FACTS 
FERC’s Order 745 focuses on “demand response resources”—i.e. 
entities “capable of providing demand response”15—that are 
customers in wholesale energy markets or aggregators of retail 
customers.16 “Demand Response” is defined as a “reduction in the 
consumption of electric energy by customers from their expected 
consumption in response to an increase in the price of electric energy 
or to incentive payments designed to induce lower consumption of 
electric energy.”17 
On March 15, 2011 FERC issued Order 745, titled “Demand 
Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets.”18 
Order 745 requires the institutions that administrator regional energy 
markets—known as Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) 
and Independent System Operators (ISOs) (hereinafter collectively 
encompassed within the term RTO) and described in greater detail 
below—to compensate “demand response resources . . . at the market 
price for energy” as an alternative to generation of additional 
electricity “when dispatch of that demand response resource is cost-
effective.”19 In other words, Order 745 is designed to make RTOs buy 
 
 15.  18 C.F.R. § 35.28(b)(5) (2015). 
 16.  Demand Response Comp. in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 134 FERC ¶ 
61187, 2011 WL 890975 at *3 [hereinafter Order 745]. 
 17.  18 C.F.R. § 35.28(b)(4) (2015). 
 18.  Order 745, supra note 3. 
 19.  Id. at *1. 
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energy back from the market rather than pay for new energy when 
generating new energy would be inefficient. 
A.  An Overview of the Energy Market 
Energy markets used to be dominated by local monopolies that 
generated, transmitted, and delivered energy directly to consumers 
within state lines. The modern market is largely divided into specialist 
entities that cross state borders, responsible for generation, 
transmission, or distribution.20 Today, electricity most frequently 
reaches consumers through an interstate “grid,” which allows the 
industry to pool the electricity regionally and transmit it over long 
distances.21 
Most electricity served to U.S. consumers originates as a 
transmission in the “wholesale market” from a power generator to a 
local distributor through a RTO.22 RTOs facilitate open access to 
transmission throughout the grid.23 The generators put electricity up 
for sale, the distributors bid for it, and the RTO facilitates 
“nondiscriminatory open-access” transmission to allow for 
competitive, unimpeded power markets.24 The final “retail market” 
transaction takes place between the local distributor and the retail 
customer.25 
B.  FERC Sees a Market Failure in the Form of Inelastic Demand for 
Electricity 
Unlike most commodities, electricity on the energy grid is not 
stored for later use; it is used and produced contemporaneously.26 To 
 
 20.  See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2002); OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, FEDERAL 
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, ENERGY PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY MARKET 
BASICS 41 (2015) [hereinafter “Energy Primer”]. 
 21.  See New York, 535 U.S. at 7. 
 22.  See Energy Primer, supra note 7, at 40 (“[T]wo-thirds of the nation’s electricity load is 
served in RTO regions.”). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id.; see also New York, 535 U.S. at 10 (explaining that FERC’s rule would provide for 
“nondiscriminatory open-access transmission services” to encourage competitively priced 
electricity). 
 25.  See Energy Primer, supra note 7, at 27. 
 26.  See Brief of Private Petitioners at 7, EnerNOC, Inc. v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, Nos. 
14-840, 841 (U.S. July 9, 2015) [hereinafter Brief of Private Petitioners] (“Electricity cannot 
currently be cost-effectively stored for later use in significant quantities.”); Brief for the 
Petitioner at 8, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, No. 14-840 (U.S. July 9, 2015) [hereinafter 
Brief for the Petitioner] (“[E]lectricity generally cannot be stored.”); see also Elec. Power 
Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 228 (D.C. Cir. 2014) cert. granted in part, 135 S. Ct. 2049, 
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avoid waste or lack of supply, electricity production—i.e. supply from 
electricity generators—must be constantly adjusted to track demand.27 
Electricity use, however, is variable. Use tends to spike at certain 
times of the day or in response to various circumstances, such as a 
heat wave that causes consumers to switch on air conditioners en 
masse.28 During these periods of spiked demand for electricity, supply 
needs to be supplemented. Generators must turn on additional power 
sources, and the supplemental electricity often must originate from 
the more costly sources of power, which are turned on only when 
other, more efficient sources are at full-capacity.29 The cost of 
producing electricity typically spikes along with demand, but 
consumers are often cushioned from fluctuations in cost by state 
agencies that set a single retail price for electricity over a longer 
period, regardless of cost fluctuations.30 Higher prices, therefore, do 
not influence demand for electricity, so consumers will frequently 
consume electricity even when the costs to produce the electricity are 
higher than the value to the consumer.31 
Distributors will demand electricity in the wholesale market at 
whatever quantity its retail customers demand, regardless of price. 
Thus, demand in the wholesale market is likewise uncoupled from the 
cost of supplying electricity.32 
Consequently, in the U.S., “[e]lectricity demand (overall) is 
generally inelastic to price.”33 As the cost of generating electricity 
 
191 L. Ed. 2d 954 (2015) and cert. granted in part sub nom. EnerNOC, Inc. v. Elec. Power Supply 
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 2049, 191 L. Ed. 2d 954 (2015) (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
 27.  See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 753 F.3d at 228 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (“[E]lectricity, 
unlike most commodities, cannot be stored for later use. There must instead be a continual, 
contemporaneous matching of supply to meet current electricity demand.”). 
 28.  See Energy Primer, supra note 7, at 41. 
 29.  See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 753 F.3d at 228 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (“[A]t hours of 
peak usage (e.g., a summer afternoon in Washington, D.C. when countless air conditioners toil 
against the humidity and heat), the suppliers of electricity must marshal the least efficient and 
most costly power plants to match the soaring demand for electricity.”). 
 30.  See Energy Primer, supra note 7, at 43–44 (explaining that “[s]tate regulatory agencies 
set prices and policies affecting retail customer service” and “most end use consumers are not 
exposed to real-time electricity prices”); see also Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 753 F.3d at 228 
(Edwards, J., dissenting) (“Retail electricity prices are generally regulated to remain constant 
over longer periods of time. That is, consumers do not pay different amounts during different 
hours of the day, notwithstanding the sharply vacillating cost of producing electricity.”). 
 31.  See Electric Power Supply Ass’n, 753 F.3d at 228 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (noting that 
retail demand is not price responsive). 
 32.  See id. 
 33.  See Energy Primer, supra note 7, at 44; see also Order 745, supra note 3, at 45. 
(“[D]emand responsiveness to price changes is relatively inelastic in the electric industry and 
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increases and drives up the price of electricity, demand in the retail 
market is unaffected. Retail consumers never notice the peaks in 
price of electricity generation and therefore have no incentive to 
reduce consumption. Thus, the price of electricity remains artificially 
elevated for all consumers over the long run.34 
FERC found that the uncoupling of price and demand is a 
systematic market problem because, without normal interaction 
between price and consumption, the energy market suffers from 
inefficient and artificially high prices.35 FERC concluded that demand 
must have some impact on the market for prices to be “just and 
reasonable in the organized wholesale energy markets.”36 
C.  FERC Sees Wholesale Demand Response as a Solution to the 
Market Failure 
To rectify the problem, FERC decided to encourage the market 
for demand response resources.37 FERC determined that wholesale 
demand response can balance supply and demand just as freely 
fluctuating prices might in an effective retail market.38 
In effect, federal policymakers recognized two possible methods 
for demand to play its proper part in adjusting consumption: freely 
fluctuating prices that force consumers to adjust their consumption or 
else suffer higher prices, or payments to consumers that offer a 
“carrot” to incentivize reduced consumption at peak times.39 By 
paying consumers to decrease energy use, electricity markets can be 
stabilized through “voluntary” reductions.40 Rather than offer 
 
does not play as significant a role in setting the wholesale energy market price.”). 
 34.  See id. 
 35.  See Order 745, supra note 3, at *1 (arguing that “a market functions effectively only 
when both supply and demand can meaningfully participate,” and determining that once 
demand is factored into the market, customers will benefit from reduced prices). 
 36.  Id at *3. 
 37.  See id. at *2 (“We conclude that when a demand response resource participating in an 
organized wholesale energy market administered by an RTO or ISO has the capability to 
balance supply and demand.”). 
 38.  See id. at *7 (“[A]ctive participation by customers in the form of demand response in 
organized wholesale energy markets helps to increase competition in those markets.”). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Note that the term “voluntary” used in this context is controversial. FERC contests 
consumers “voluntarily” decrease demand to obtain payments, while critics contest that retail 
customers are “drawn into” the demand response market by incentives, such that their decision 
is not “voluntary” in the strictest sense of the word. See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 
F.3d 216, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“FERC claims when retail consumers voluntarily participate in 
the wholesale market, they fall within the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction to make rules for 
that market . . . . The problem, Petitioners say, is the Commission has no authority to draw retail 
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consumers subsidies directly, however, FERC decided to focus its 
efforts on wholesale markets.41 
While states and utilities have started addressing the problem of 
price inelasticity directly in the retail market, FERC decided it could 
supplement these efforts by setting a rate at which RTOs would pay 
for demand response resources in the wholesale markets.42 To date, 
several demand response resources have entered into wholesale 
markets, typically as a means to improve grid reliability by providing 
the RTO a quick means to curtail energy usage if power supply is 
insufficient.43 Wholesale demand response resources are typically 
third-party aggregators who buy commitments to refrain from energy 
use from consumers when called upon; aggregators then resell those 
commitments to RTOs in wholesale energy markets.44 Retail demand 
response, by contrast, consists of direct subsidies to effectively change 
the retail price of energy paid by consumers.45 
Until Order 745, RTOs paid wholesale demand response 
resources variable amounts and developed their own compensation 
methodologies.46 FERC recognized, however, that setting a stable and 
uniform price for wholesale demand response could foster a more 
stable and vibrant market for demand response.47 Rather than make 
up an arbitrary price for demand response, FERC pegged demand 
response to the “locational marginal price” (LMP) of electricity, which 
is—as its name suggests—the cost of producing an additional unit of 
electricity within a given region.48 FERC determined that encouraging 
the demand response market would give RTOs an alternative to 
 
customers into the wholesale markets by paying them not to make retail purchases.”). 
 41.  Order 745, supra note 7 at *3. 
 42.  See id. (“[A] number of states and utilities are pursuing retail-level price-responsive 
demand initiatives . . . . Our focus here is on customers or aggregators of retail customers 
providing, through bids or self-schedules, demand response that acts as a resource in organized 
wholesale energy markets.”). 
 43.  Id. at *11.  See also Energy Primer, supra note 7 at 45–46 (“Some RTOs permit DRR 
to participate in their markets as voluntary reliability resources. DRR also can participate in 
wholesale electricity markets as capacity resources and receive advance reservation payments in 
return for their commitment to participate when called.”). 
 44.  Energy Primer, supra note 7, at 46. 
 45.  See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 26, at 28 (“[I]n a retail-level demand-response 
program, the compensation to retail users is not funded by adjusting wholesale rates charged in 
day-ahead and real-time markets, and the demand-response commitments are not selected 
based on their ability to clear the wholesale market. Rather, the demand response payments are 
recouped through adjustments to retail rates (potentially over the long term).”). 
 46.  Order 745, supra note 3 at *11. 
 47.  Id. at *2–3. 
 48.  Id. 
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generation of additional power when they require additional capacity 
and thereby provide for an efficient energy market with just prices.49 
In addition, FERC added the caveat that the price should only be 
fixed when cost effective because paying for non-use of electricity 
sometimes leads to higher prices by undermining efficiencies of 
scale.50 
D.  Procedural History 
EPSA and four other energy industry associations challenged 
Order 745 by petitioning for judicial review by the D.C. Circuit of 
Appeals.51 The D.C. Circuit held that FERC’s action was ultra vires 
and vacated the rule in its entirety.52 The Supreme Court granted 
petitions for writ of certiorari from both FERC and EnerNOC and 
consolidated the proceedings.53 Justice Alito recused himself from the 
case.54 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  FERC’s Jurisdiction in Historical Context 
The jurisdiction of FERC was initially tailored “to provide 
effective federal regulation of the expanding business of transmitting 
and selling electric power in interstate commerce.”55 
Before FERC was established, electricity was largely produced, 
transported and supplied to consumers locally.56 Utilities were subject 
to state or local regulation.57 By 1927, however, the nature of the 
energy industry had changed.58 Instead of one local utility engaged in 
producing and delivering power, the market had fractured so that a 
power producer might operate the local power plant, while a separate 
 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See id. at *3 (explaining that wholesale consumers pay for electricity at a price per 
megawatt that decreases as the load carried to that consumer increases). 
 51.  Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 218 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 52.  Id. at 225. 
 53.  EnerNOC, Inc. v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 2049, 2050 (2015). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002) (quoting Gulf States Util. Co. v. Fed. Power 
Comm’n, 411 U.S. 747, 758 (1973)). 
 56.  See id. at 5 (“[M]ost electricity was sold by vertically integrated utilities that had 
constructed their own power plants, transmission lines, and local delivery systems.”). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  See generally Public Util. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927) 
(finding that the business relationship between a Rhode Island power producer and 
Massachusetts power supplier was “essentially national in character”). 
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power supplier might buy and transmit power to distant retail 
customers.59 The price of energy to the retail customer in one state 
now depended on the wholesale transaction between producer and 
supplier in another state, leading the Supreme Court to conclude the 
new wholesale market for energy was “essentially national in 
character.”60 
The Court held in Public Util. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. 
Co. that states are prohibited from regulating the new wholesale 
market.61 The Court reasoned that because one state’s regulation of 
the wholesale market impacted retail customers and rates in other 
states, no state could regulate such an interstate practice without 
conflicting with the interests of another state, and the power to 
regulate should fall exclusively to the federal government under the 
Commerce Clause.62 Because only states had theretofore regulated 
the energy industry, the decision created what became known as the 
“Attleboro gap”: a hole in regulation that could be filled “only ‘by the 
exercise of the power vested in Congress.’”63 
By passing the Federal Power Act (FPA) in 1935, Congress 
intended to fill the Attleboro gap and transfer to the federal 
government regulatory power traditionally held by the state.64 Section 
206(b)(1) of the FPA granted the precursor of FERC “jurisdiction as 
including ‘the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce’ 
and ‘the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate 
commerce.’”65 “Furthermore, § 205 of the FPA prohibits, among other 
things, unreasonable rates and undue discrimination ‘with respect to 
any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission,” and “§ 206 gave the FPC the power to correct such 
unlawful practices.”66 
 
 59.  See, e.g., id. at 84 (explaining that one company “engaged in manufacturing electric 
current” while another bought that current and “engaged in supplying” it for consumption). 
 60.  Id. at 90. 
 61.  See id. 
 62.  See id. (“The rate is therefore not subject to regulation by either of the two states in 
the guise of protection to their respective local interests; but, if such regulation is required it can 
only be attained by the exercise of the power vested in Congress.”). 
 63.  New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002) (quoting Attleboro, 273 U.S. at 89). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 6–7 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012)). 
 66.  Id. at 7. 
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B.  Section 201 Grants to FERC Jurisdiction over the Attleboro Gap 
and More 
The FPA reserves for states some power to regulate the energy 
industry, including retail sales.67 Section 201(a) of the FPA generally 
limited FERC’s jurisdiction in a policy declaration “to those matters 
which are not subject to regulation by the States.”68 Section 201(b) 
specifically granted authority over “the sale of electric energy at 
wholesale” and specifically excluded from FERC’s authority “any 
other sale of electric energy.”69 This was interpreted as Congress’s 
intent “to draw a bright line easily ascertained, between state and 
federal jurisdiction,” with retail sales falling under state authority and 
wholesale sales under FERC’s authority.70 
As FERC’s authority to set wholesale rates conflicts with the 
state’s authority to set retail rates, the power of FERC to regulate 
wholesale sales has generally been thought to preempt as a result of 
the “plenary authority” explicitly extended by Congress.71 The general 
limitation of FERC’s authority in § 201(a) is considered “a mere 
policy declaration” while § 201(b) is “a clear and specific grant of 
jurisdiction” that confers authority “even if the particular grant seems 
inconsistent with the broadly expressed purpose” articulated in the 
policy declaration.72 
The Supreme Court has more recently noted that “the landscape 
of the electric industry has changed since the enactment of the FPA, 
when the electricity universe was neatly divided into spheres of retail 
versus wholesale sales.”73 In addition, the Supreme Court clarified that 
the “bright line” between retail and wholesale specifically refers to 
sales, not necessarily retail markets, because retail transmissions are 
under FERC’s jurisdiction.74 There is some ambiguity, however, over 
 
 67.  See id. at 23 (“[T]he legislative history demonstrates Congress’ interest in retaining 
state jurisdiction over retail sales.”). 
 68.  16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012). 
 69.  16 U.S.C. § 824(b). 
 70.  Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964). 
 71.  See, e.g., Nantahala Power and Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986) 
(“Once FERC sets such a rate, a State may not conclude in setting retail rates that the FERC-
approved wholesale rates are unreasonable. A State must rather give effect to Congress’s desire 
to give FERC plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates, and to ensure that the States do 
not interfere with this authority.”). 
 72.  New York, 535 U.S. at 22 (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n, 376 U.S. at 215). 
 73.  New York, 535 U.S. at 16. 
 74.  See id. at 16–17 (“There is no language in the statute limiting FERC’s transmission 
jurisdiction to the wholesale market, although the statute does limit FERC’s sale jurisdiction to 
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the extent to which the distinction between wholesale and retail 
applies (1) solely to sales, or (2) to many components of the retail 
market, with federal authority over retail transmissions exceptional as 
“a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction.”75 
C.  Sections 205 and 206 Grant FERC Jurisdiction to Fix Market 
Failures Affecting Wholesale Rates 
The 1935 FPA also conferred FERC with responsibility to ensure 
the wholesale market operates with “just and reasonable” practices.76 
Where FERC uncovers “unreasonable, unjust, unduly discriminatory 
or preferential . . . practices . . . affecting [wholesale] rates,” 206(a) 
requires that FERC determine practices to remedy the deficiency in 
the wholesale market and order “the just and reasonable . . . 
practice . . . to be thereafter observed.”77 In fact, §§ 205 and 206 do not 
just give FERC market-correcting authority where it investigates and 
finds unreasonable or unjust practices “affecting” wholesale rates—
for FERC, § 206 creates a duty.78 
The Court has explicitly noted that FERC’s § 206 duty expands 
FERC’s jurisdiction because “practices . . . affecting [wholesale] rates” 
is a broader concept than wholesale rates themselves.79 FERC may 
not be permitted to regulate retail sales directly because of the limits 
of § 201(b), but FERC’s duty under § 206 compels it to consider “the 
relationship between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional rate 
structures.”80 Thus, when the relationship between wholesale and retail 
results in “unreasonable, unjust, unduly discriminatory or 
preferential . . . practices,” FERC “does not invade a nonjurisdictional 
area” when it rectifies a jointly retail-wholesale problem, so as long as 
the tools FERC implements do not directly regulate retail sales.81 
 
 
that at wholesale.”). 
 75.  See id. at 22 (“Because the FPA contains such ‘a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction’ 
to FERC over interstate transmissions . . . the prefatory language [of § 201(a)] does not 
undermine FERC’s jurisdiction.”) (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 
205, 215 (1964)). 
 76.  16 U.S.C. § 824d (2012); id. § 824e. 
 77.  Id. § 824e(a). 
 78.  New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 27 (discussing FERC’s “§ 206 obligation to regulate”). 
 79.  See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 281–82 (1976) (“The rules, 
practices, or contracts ‘affecting’ the jurisdictional rate are not themselves limited to the 
jurisdictional context.”). 
 80.  See id. 
 81.  See id. at 280–81. 
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To identify a problem that needs correction—whether the 
problem exists purely within the wholesale market or affects it—the 
D.C. Circuit has held that FERC does not need to make 
“individualized findings” but can rely on “general findings of a 
systematic problem to support imposition of an industry-wide 
solution.”82 It may be sufficient for FERC to identify a “general” or 
“theoretical threat” for the agency to exercise corrective action under 
§ 206.83 The Supreme Court has implicitly hinted approval of FERC’s 
general market-correcting authority under §§ 205 and 206.84 
D.  Courts owe Deference to Agency Decisions 
The Supreme Court recently held that courts must apply Chevron 
deference to an agency’s determination of its own jurisdiction.85 
Under the Chevron rule: 
‘When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute 
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.’ First, 
applying the ordinary tools of statutory construction, the court 
must determine ‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is 
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’ But ‘if 
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, 
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.’86 
When the interrelation between two statutory provisions creates 
ambiguity in the agency’s authority, the Court will accept the agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of its own jurisdiction.87 On the other hand, 
 
 82.  Interstate Natural Gas Ass’n of America v. FERC, 285 F.3d 18, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(citing Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d 
sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002)); see also South Carolina Public Service 
Authority v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding a “theoretical threat” to the 
energy market sufficient to trigger action under § 206) (per curiam). 
 83.  South Carolina Public Service Authority, 762 F.3d at 64. 
 84.  See, e.g., New York, 535 U.S. at 14 (2002) (describing the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that 
§§ 205 and 206 permit marketwide solutions to marketwide problems and going on to uphold 
the determination of jurisdiction); see also Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. 
No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., Wash., 554 U.S. 527, 535–36 (2008) (describing FERC’s recent 
“innovative” and “ambitious program of market-based reforms . . . to break down regulatory 
and economic barriers that hinder a free market”). 
 85.  City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1871–73 (2013). 
 86.  Id. at 1868 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
 87.  See, e.g., City of Arlington, Tex., 133 S. Ct. at 1868 (“Statutory ambiguities will be 
resolved, within the bounds of reasonable interpretation, not by the courts but by the 
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when the statute is clear and unambiguous regarding the agency’s 
jurisdiction, the agency is bound by the statute’s plain meaning.88 
Furthermore, in “ratemaking decisions” under §§ 205 and 206, the 
Supreme Court grants FERC “great deference” because “the 
statutory requirement that rates be just and reasonable is obviously 
incapable of precise judicial definition.”89 The Court has established 
that by using broad language in §§ 205 and 206 Congress conferred 
FERC considerable discretion to specify what constitutes a “just and 
reasonable” rate.90 The “abstract quality” of “reasonableness” leaves 
FERC a “substantial” zone of discretion.91 
Agency findings of fact are also entitled to deference.92 When 
FERC issues an order, judicial review determines whether the 
decision was “arbitrary or capricious” or lacked “substantial 
evidence,” but without identifying a finding as unreasonable or 
unwarranted “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency.”93 
III. HOLDING 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals applied Chevron to FERC’s 
assertion of jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit held that the text of the FPA 
unambiguously forecloses FERC’s assertion of authority, thus Order 
745 was vacated as “ultra vires agency action.”94 
In reaching the conclusion that FERC’s Order is ultra vires, the 
court reasoned: (i) demand response is not a wholesale sale, so FERC 
cannot claim authority to issue Order 745 under § 201(b)(1);95 (ii) 
 
administering agency.”). 
 88.  See id. (“Congress knows to speak in plain terms when it wishes to circumscribe, and in 
capacious terms when it wishes to enlarge, agency discretion.”). 
 89.  Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc., 554 U.S. at 532. 
 90.  See Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951) 
(“Petitioner cannot separate what Congress has joined together. It cannot litigate in a judicial 
forum its general right to a reasonable rate, ignoring the qualification that it shall be made 
specific only by exercise of the Commission’s judgment, in which there is some considerable 
element of discretion.”). 
 91.  See id. 
 92.  See 16 U.S.C. § 825l (2012) (“The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if 
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”). 
 93.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983). 
 94.  See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n. v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(“Ultimately, given Order 745’s direct regulation of the retail market, we vacate the rule in its 
entirety as ultra vires agency action.”). 
 95.  Id. at 221. 
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demand response is a retail market phenomenon, which is “clearly” 
outside FERC’s jurisdiction by “the specific limits of § 201;”96 (iii) the 
broad grant of authority to regulate practices “affecting” the 
wholesale market under §§ 205 and 206 cannot outweigh “the specific 
limits of § 201;”97 and (iv) Order 745’s direct purpose is to incentivize 
behavior by retail consumers, so it is not relevant that FERC retains 
authority to regulate even when a rule has “incidentally incentivized” 
actions FERC could not directly require.98 The D.C. Circuit went on to 
argue that even if FERC had jurisdiction, its action was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
A.  FERC Lacks Jurisdiction under § 201(b)(1) 
The D.C. Circuit held that FERC could not claim authority to 
regulate demand response resources under § 201(b)(1) because that 
section only grants jurisdiction over wholesale sales.99 Section 
201(b)(1) empowers FERC to regulate “the sale of electric energy at 
wholesale in interstate commerce” but not “any other sale of electric 
energy.”100 The D.C. Circuit found that demand response “is not a sale 
at all,” and therefore cannot constitute a wholesale sale subject to 
FERC’s jurisdiction.101 
B.  Demand Response is a Retail Phenomenon 
The D.C. Circuit’s holding relies on its finding that Order 745 
regulates the retail market rather than the wholesale market.102 
Although FERC insisted it is regulating “wholesale demand 
response” as opposed to “retail demand response,”103 the D.C. Circuit 
found the distinction to be a “fiction.”104 Instead, the D.C. Circuit 
 
 96.  Id. at 222. 
 97.  See id. (“The broad ‘affecting’ language of §§ 205 and 206 does not erase the specific 
limits of § 201.”). 
 98.  Id. at n.2 (citing Conn. Dept. of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 
2009)). 
 99.  Id. at 221. 
 100.  16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). 
 101.  Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d at 221. 
 102.  See id. at 222–23 (reasoning that FERC cannot overcome its “jurisdictional quandary” 
because by regulating demand response FERC has directly regulated the retail market, which 
should be excluded from FERCs jurisdiction over “practices affecting the wholesale market”). 
 103.  See id. at 220 (“The Commission draws this distinction between ‘wholesale demand 
response’ and ‘retail demand response’ in an attempt to narrow the logical reach of its rule.”). 
 104.  Id. at 221. 
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concluded, “[d]emand response—simply put—is part of the retail 
market.”105 
The D.C. Circuit disagreed with FERC’s characterization of the 
demand response market as “wholesale” and “retail” because both 
have the same goal: “a reduction in consumption” by the retail 
consumer.106 The D.C. Circuit considered “retail demand response” as 
“FERC speak” for manipulating consumer behavior using prices, and 
“wholesale demand response” as manipulating consumer behavior 
using incentive payments, which the court considered “the same in 
substance and effect” as a retail credit.107 Incentive payments 
originating in the wholesale market are not “wholesale sales,” but 
instead are effectively credits to alter consumers’ retail behavior.108 
C.  FERC’s Jurisdiction under §§ 205 and 206 is Limited 
The D.C. Circuit held that §§ 205 and 206 grant FERC broad 
jurisdiction over practices that affect wholesale rates, but not over 
demand response resources.109 
Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA “task FERC with ensuring ‘all 
rules and regulations affecting . . . rates’ in connection with the 
wholesale sale of electric energy are ‘just and reasonable.’”110 
The D.C. Circuit held that the language of §§ 205 and 206 fail to 
establish FERC’s jurisdiction over demand response because the 
language is too broad to overcome a clear prohibition on regulation 
of “the retail market.”111 The D.C. Circuit determined that the FPA 
includes a “clearly articulated” prohibition on regulation of “the retail 
market” that can only be overcome by a “clear and specific grant of 
 
 105.  Id. at 223. 
 106.  See id. (“[Demand response] involves retail customers, their decision whether to 
purchase at retail, and the levels of retail electricity consumption . . . a reduction in consumption 
cannot be a ‘wholesale sale.’”) (emphasis added). 
 107.  See id. at 222–23 (agreeing with FERC that “demand response can occur in two ways—
through a response to either price change or incentive payments” but concluding “[o]rdering an 
ISO to compensate a consumer for reducing its demand is the same in substance and effect as 
issuing a credit” which is, effectively, an impermissible change to retail price). 
 108.  See id. at 223 (“[A] reduction in consumption cannot be a ‘wholesale sale.’”). 
 109.  See id. at 222 (“FERC can regulate practices affecting the wholesale market under §§ 
205 and 206, provided the Commission is not directly regulating a matter subject to state 
control, such as the retail market.”). 
 110.  Id. at 221 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012)). 
 111.  See id. at 221–22 (“The broad ‘affecting’ language of §§ 205 and 206 does not erase the 
specific limits of § 201.”). 
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jurisdiction” elsewhere in the statute.112 The D.C. Circuit cited its 
“clearly articulated” prohibition on regulation of “the retail market” 
in § 201(a), which limits FERC’s jurisdiction “to those matters which 
are not subject to regulation by the States.”113 Because the retail 
market is subject to regulation by the States, the D.C. Circuit reasoned 
it couldn’t be within the jurisdiction of FERC.114 Sections 205 and 206, 
which the D.C. Circuit characterized as “broad,” fall short of the 
“clear and specific grant of jurisdiction” necessary to outweigh the 
prohibition.115 
In short, the D.C. Circuit held that “FERC can regulate practices 
affecting the wholesale market under §§ 205 and 206, provided the 
Commission is not directly regulating a matter subject to state 
control, such as the retail market.”116 The D.C. Circuit found 
regulation of demand response resources to constitute direct 
regulation of the retail market, and thus §§ 205 and 206 cannot 
empower FERC to regulate demand response resources.117 
D.  FERC Regulated the Retail Market Directly 
The D.C. Circuit’s holding also relied on its finding that Order 745 
directly impacts the retail market.118 The D.C. Circuit noted that FERC 
is permitted to regulate the retail market indirectly. In other words, 
FERC can incentivize behavior in the retail market as “a logical 
byproduct” of a permissible rule, but the D.C. Circuit found that by 
incentivizing demand response “FERC has directly incentivized 
action it cannot directly require.”119 
E.  FERC’s Regulation of Demand Response is Arbitrary and 
Capricious 
The D.C. Circuit held that even if FERC had the statutory 
authority to execute Order 745, the order would fail as arbitrary and 
 
 112.  Id. (quoting New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 22 (2002)). 
 113.  Id. at 221. 
 114.  Id. at 221–22 (citing Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FERC, 452 F.3d 822, 824 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006)). 
 115.  Id. at 221 (“Without boundaries, §§ 205 and 206 could ostensibly authorize FERC to 
regulate any number of areas, including the steel, fuel, and labor markets.”). 
 116.  Id. at 222. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  See id. at n.2 (differentiating between cases in which FERC has authority to regulate, 
but its rule has an incidental impact on retail market, and this case, where the D.C. Circuit finds 
FERC’s rule “reaches directly into the retail market”). 
 119. Id. 
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capricious.120 The court held that FERC failed to engage the 
counterarguments raised against the order,121 including those made by 
fellow FERC Commissioner Moeller’s.122 According to the D.C. 
Circuit, FERC further failed to properly review Moeller’s concerns 
that by overcompensating demand response resources through 
payments and retained costs of generation, Order 745 would unfairly 
benefit retail consumers and reduce savings made by the generators.123 
The court also held that FERC was unable to adequately explain124 its 
decision regarding the compensation levels.125 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Sections 205 and 206 Grant FERC Jurisdiction over Wholesale 
Demand Response 
FERC argues126 that the FPA grants sufficient authority under §§ 
205 and 206 to issue Order 745 as a regulation of practices affecting 
the wholesale rates.127 FERC’s argument focuses on a plain-text 
reading of § 206, which authorizes FERC to fix by order a just and 
reasonable rule, regulation, or practice affecting wholesale rates.128 
FERC argues that demand response is an efficient method through 
which it can satisfy its duty to ensure just and reasonable wholesale 
rates by balancing energy market supply and demand.129 FERC makes 
a point to argue that without this authority, demand response could 
not operate in the wholesale market due to the inability of the States 
to regulate interstate transmission or wholesale sales of electricity.130 
Emphasizing the inelasticity of demand for electricity and its statutory 
duty to ensure just and reasonable rates, FERC views wholesale 
 
 120.  Id. at 224. 
 121.  Id. (citing NorAm Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 148 F.3d 1158, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 
1998)). 
 122.  Id. at 225. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Note that in this section, unless otherwise noted, both petitioners’ arguments are 
generally attributed to FERC alone for sake of readability since FERC and EnerNOC make 
mostly similar arguments. 
 127.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 13, at 24. 
 128.  16 U.S.C. §824e(a) (2012). 
 129.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 26, at 22–23. 
 130.  Id. at 30. 
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demand response as the efficient tool with which it seeks to fulfill its 
statutory duty.131 
B.  Order 745 is an Attempt to Regulate the Retail Market 
The Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA) counters FERC’s 
main statutory argument by stating that the FPA, in fact, proscribes 
FERC from regulating demand response resources in the wholesale 
market, which it calls a “transparent attempt to dictate the effective 
rate for retail sales.”132 EPSA points to the limits imposed § 201(a)133 
and claims demand response is subject to exclusive regulation by the 
states because the aim of demand response is reduction of 
consumption by retail customers.134 EPSA notes that, while demand 
response offers benefits, retail demand response already provides 
incentives to retail consumers under state regulation.135 
FERC counters EPSA’s state retail argument by focusing on the 
construction of the text and the relative strength of §§ 201(a) and 206 
in setting forth FERC’s jurisdiction.136 According to FERC, § 206 
grants specific jurisdiction over rules, regulations, and practices 
affecting wholesale rates and § 201(a) acts merely as a general 
declaration that jurisdiction is subject to regulation by the States if 
not granted in the Act.137 FERC notes that the Court has held the 
language of § 201(a) to be “a mere policy declaration that cannot 
nullify a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction.”138 FERC again 
references the Attleboro gap, arguing that § 206 must be such a 
specific grant so as to allow regulation of the otherwise unregulated 
space of wholesale demand response, especially when read in 
conjunction with Congress’s intent to remove barriers to demand 
response participation via the Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1252(f).139 
In response, EPSA notes that § 201(b) specifically prohibits 
FERC from regulating retail sales, even if § 201(a) is considered to be 
 
 131.  Id. at 19. 
 132.  Brief for the Respondents at 25, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, Nos. 14-840, 14–
841 (U.S. Aug. 31, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for the Respondents]. 
 133.  16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012). 
 134.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 132, at 28. 
 135.  Id. at 27. 
 136.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 26, at 36. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. (quoting New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002)). 
 139.  Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct”) §1252(f), Pub. L. No. 190–58, 119 Stat. 966 (16 
U.S.C. § 2642). 
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general.140 EPSA states that in doing so, FERC has made “a 
purposeful effort to change the timing and terms of a retail sale,” so 
FERC’s action directly involves a retail sale.141 EPSA also points out 
that the power to regulate retail sales necessarily includes the power 
to prohibit them from occurring, making connection to the FERC-
characterized “non-sale” result of demand response.142 On behalf of 
Petitioners, EnerNOC responds by arguing that wholesale demand 
response does not involve the sale of electricity.143 Instead, EnerNOC 
argues, wholesale demand response is properly viewed as an 
investment by demand response servicers to indirectly affect the 
consumption levels of electricity.144 
C.  The Court owes Chevron Deference to FERC 
Arguing in the alternative, FERC states that Order 745 should at 
least be subject to Chevron deference.145 FERC argues that because 
the FPA limits its authority through a mere policy declaration under § 
201(a) and focuses narrowly on restricting regulation of sales in § 
201(b), the Act fails to establish a clear statutory proscription of the 
authority FERC seeks to exercise.146 Thus, without such an 
unambiguous statutory prohibition, FERC argues that it is entitled to 
discuss whether it acted upon a permissible construction of the FPA 
under Chevron.147 EPSA, on the other hand, argues that the FPA 
unambiguously limits FERC’s jurisdiction over practices “affecting 
wholesale rates” to matters that are not already subject to regulation 
by the States.148 Additionally, EPSA also cites the Energy Policy Act of 
2005, arguing that it reserved to states the jurisdiction of directly 
regulating demand response while merely tasking the federal 
government with removing barriers of participation.149 
 
 
 140.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 132, at 36 (citing Brief for the Petitioner, supra 
note 26, at 54). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 38 (citing Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)). 
 143.  Brief of Private Petitioners, supra note 26, at 31–32. 
 144.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 26, at 44–45. 
 145.  Id. at 44. 
 146.  Id. at 44–45. 
 147.  Id. at 44. 
 148.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 132, at 43 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012)). 
 149.  Id. at 44. 
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D.  Order 745 is Arbitrary and Capricious 
Lastly, EPSA argues that if the Court were to apply Chevron, 
Order 745 is arbitrary and capricious due to FERC’s failure to use 
proper pricing to pursue its goal of balancing supply and demand.150 
EPSA argues that FERC failed to properly consider the claims of 
Commissioner Moeller, who argued that setting the price paid for 
demand response at LMP-level overcompensates demand response 
resources and creates an inappropriate incentive for demand response 
participants who would derive more benefit from such payments than 
energy usage. This incentive would encourage a greater number of 
participants than would occur under market conditions absent that 
incentive, thereby creating a new mismatch between supply and 
demand.151 Further, EPSA notes that Moeller’s proposal—to reduce 
LMP by the cost of power generation (LMP minus G)—would lead to 
more efficient participation and an effective rate equal to the 
wholesale rate, a calculation realized but not applied by FERC to 
Order 745.152 In sum, EPSA argues that FERC’s failure to properly 
address Moeller’s concerns or reasonably explain its implementation 
of LMP-level pricing makes Order 745 arbitrary and capricious.153 
In response, FERC argues that it has “examine[d] the relevant 
data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action,” 
including the use of the LMP price.154 FERC argues that given its § 
206 authority to regulate practices affecting wholesale rates and its § 
205 duty to ensure that such rates are just and reasonable, discharging 
such duty demands deference to FERC judgment, regardless of a 
dissenting opinion.155 In addition, FERC adopted the “net-benefits” 
test, which restricted LMP payments to scenarios in which such 
payments would reduce the total price paid by consumers.156 This test 
allegedly resolves the problem raised by the dissenting member. 
Therefore, FERC’s use of LMP is reasonable, even if deference is not 
afforded to its expertise.157 FERC believes the “net-benefits” test can 
 
 150.  Id. at 49–50. 
 151.  Id. at 54. 
 152.  Id. at 55–56 (citing FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)). 
 153.  Id. at 58–59. 
 154.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 13, at 46–47 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of 
the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
 155.  Id. at 47 (citing Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of 
Snohomish Cnty., Wash., 554 U.S. 527, 532 (2008)). 
 156.  Id. at 50. 
 157.  Id. at 52 (citing North Baja Pipeline, LLC v. FERC, 483 F.3d 819, 820 (D.C. Cir. 
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overcome economic inefficiencies and is more practicable than LMP 
minus G.158 Thus, the process behind Order 745’s issuance should 
suffice to surmount the arbitrary and capricious threshold of Chevron. 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court once again finds itself defining the bounds of 
FERC’s jurisdiction over the energy industry. FERC v. EPSA can be 
divided into two separate conflicts. 
First, the Court will have to resolve the conflicting interpretations 
of FERC’s jurisdiction under the FPA. The issue could be cast as one 
of federalism. Put differently: under the FPA, where does federal 
authority end and state authority begin? On the other hand, that 
question may depend on whether § 201(a) limits §§ 205 and 206 at all. 
If § 201(a) is merely a subordinate prefatory clause, then the 
jurisdictional question is only whether §§ 205 and 206 permit 
regulation of the rate paid by RTOs to demand response resources. 
Second, the Court may have to resolve the conflicting 
characterizations of Order 745 and determine whether the action lies 
within FERC’s jurisdiction. The issue could be cast as one of 
deference to expert agencies. Put differently: when is it appropriate 
for unelected judges to reject an expert agency’s characterization of 
an industry practice? The D.C. Circuit correctly applied Chevron 
framework to determine the threshold question of the extent of 
FERC’s jurisdiction. It also, however, overruled FERC’s finding that 
demand response can be characterized, at least in part, as wholesale 
market activity. In doing so, the D.C. Circuit witheld the deference 
typically afforded to agencies’ findings without considering whether it 
is appropriate for a court to substitute its determinations for the 
agency’s.159 
It is likely the Supreme Court will overturn the D.C. Circuit. In 
resolving the first question of how to interpret FERC’s statutory 
jurisdiction, the Court is likely to apply the Chevron framework to 
determine (1) whether the statute sets a clear and unambiguous limit 
on FERC’s jurisdiction and, if not, (2) whether FERC’s interpretation 
of its authority is permissible. 
 
2007)). 
 158.  Id. at 55–56. 
 159.  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U. S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (noting “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency”). 
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In determining whether FERC was acting within its authority, the 
Court must also resolve the second controversy. It will have to 
determine whether FERC’s order is a direct regulation of “wholesale 
demand response,” or whether that concept is a “fiction” to disguise 
FERC’s regulation of the retail market or retail sales, as the D.C. 
Circuit found.160 
A.  The Bounds of Federal Regulatory Authority 
The jurisdictional question in this case boils down to determining 
the bounds of FERC’s authority under §§ 205 and 206. The breadth of 
FERC’s jurisdiction depends on the extent to which federal authority 
under §§ 205 and 206 is limited by the reservation of power for the 
states in § 201(a) and over “other sales” in § 201(b). Petitioners in this 
case argue §§ 205 and 206 are clear grants of authority that justify 
FERC’s order,161 while the respondents argue the conflicting limits of 
§ 201(a) and (b) prevent direct regulation of retail market and retail 
sales respectively.162 
The conflict between the sections of the statute is a question of 
statutory interpretation. The Court will therefore apply the Chevron 
framework to review FERC’s order. 
At the first step of the Chevron framework, the Court will 
consider whether the statute unambiguously forecloses FERC’s 
interpretation that it has authority under §§ 205 and 206. The 
Supreme Court will probably agree with the D.C. Circuit that retail 
sales are unambiguously outside of FERC’s jurisdiction because § 
201(b) specifically limits FERC’s jurisdiction to “the sale of electricity 
at wholesale,” but not “to any other sale of electric energy.” If the 
Court considers wholesale demand response to be an “other sale of 
electricity,” then the Court may end its analysis, but we predict this 
will not be the case.163 
The Court will likely hold as ambiguous, however, whether 
Congress intended the entire retail market to lie outside of FERC’s 
jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit did not hold FERC’s action was ultra 
vires as a retail sale, only that FERC’s action regulated behavior in 
 
 160.  Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 221 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 161.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 26, at 36. 
 162.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 132, at 24. 
 163.  See infra at Part VI, Section B (predicting the Court will defer to FERC’s expertise in 
determining whether wholesale demand response is actually a retail phenomenon). 
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the retail market.164 The Supreme Court, however, has already 
recognized FERC has jurisdiction over interstate transmission in the 
retail market.165 The Court may reiterate, as FERC argues, that a 
specific grant of jurisdiction supersedes the general and prefatory 
language of § 201(a).166 While §§ 205 and 206 may grant broad 
authority, the grant is clear and specifically enables FERC to consider 
and act upon problems outside the jurisdiction defined in § 201.167 
Moreover, nowhere does the statute’s text make explicit mention of 
the retail market. Section 201 does, as the Court held with respect to 
transmission, specifically grant FERC authority to regulate some 
elements of retail markets.168 This is not the stuff of an unambiguous 
statutory text. 
Because the Supreme Court is likely to determine that the scope 
of jurisdiction over the retail market is ambiguous, the Court will 
consider whether FERC’s interpretation that it has such authority 
under §§ 205 and 206 is reasonable. FERC’s interpretation is 
unreasonable if the agency acted in an “arbitrary and capricious” 
manner, as the D.C. Circuit held.169 If the Court finds FERC’s action 
to have been based on a permissible construction of the FPA, then it 
may defer to FERC judgment regarding the issuance of Order 745. 
As the Court has previously ruled, the “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard is narrow and in its application, courts shall not substitute its 
own judgment for that of the agency.170 Instead, the order must be 
sustained if the agency “examine[d] the relevant data and 
articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action[,] including a 
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”171 
In addition to the required agency deference of the “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard, the Congressional intent behind § 205 in 
assigning FERC the duty of both defining and ensuring “just and 
 
 164.  Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 753 F.3d at 221–22. 
 165.  New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
 166.  Id.; see also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 13, at 36. 
 167.  See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 281 (1976) (“The rules, 
practices, or contracts ‘affecting’ the jurisdictional rate are not themselves limited to the 
jurisdictional context.”). 
 168.  See generally New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
 169.  Id. at 224. 
 170.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 171.  Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). 
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reasonable”172 rates naturally leads the Court to grant greater 
deference in ratemaking decisions.173 
The Supreme Court, therefore, is likely to overturn the D.C. 
Circuit and defer to FERC’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction, 
based in large part on its past decisions in New York v. FERC and 
FPC v. Conaway.174 
B.  Deference to FERC on the Question of whether Demand Response 
Constitutes Retail or Wholesale Activity 
In addition to the question of FERC’s jurisdiction, the Court must 
also assess whether the D.C. Circuit was right to summarily reject 
FERC’s characterization of “wholesale demand response.” It might 
re-characterize demand response as a wholly retail market 
phenomenon, as the D.C. Circuit did,175 or even as a form of retail sale, 
as EPSA argues.176 
The parties debate whether demand response exists in the 
wholesale market or whether it is a metaphysically creative re-
characterization of a retail practice. FERC claims demand response 
exists at the intersection of wholesale and retail markets, analogous to 
how power distributors operate within each market as intermediaries 
between the two. FERC insists that Order 745 is tailored to regulate 
wholesale operations because it directs a wholesale rate, not a retail 
rate. On the other hand, EPSA argues that “wholesale rates” are not 
rates at all, but effectively a credit to directly alter the price of 
electricity at retail.177 FERC admits that the aim of all demand 
response is to incentivize retail behavior, because it identifies a 
problem with the relationship between the wholesale and retail 
markets, but says its solution to the problem takes place solely within 
the wholesale market, even if the order indirectly impacts retail rates 
and behavior. 
 
 172.  16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012). 
 173.  Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 
Wash., 554 U.S. 527, 532 (2008). 
 174.  New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (holding that no statutory language limits 
FERC’s authority over retail transmissions and reasoning that the spheres of retail and 
wholesale are no longer neatly divided); FPC v. Conaway, 426 U.S. 273 (1976) (holding that 
FERC’s predecessor had authority, and even duty, to consider the retail market when exercising 
its regulatory authority within the wholesale market). 
 175.  Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 223 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 176.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 132, at 25. 
 177.  Id. at 46. 
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The Court may or may not agree with FERC’s characterization of 
demand response as either “wholesale demand response” or “retail 
demand response,” but it is likely to use a more deferential standard 
than did the D.C. Circuit. 
The D.C. Circuit might even be rightly viewed as exhibiting 
inappropriate “judicial activism” when it found that “[d]emand 
response—simply put—is part of the retail market.” On its face, the 
D.C. Circuit majority treated the case as if it were a question of 
statutory interpretation subject to Chevron deference, and held the 
action ultra vires based on its statutory interpretation that FERC 
unambiguously lacks authority to directly regulate retail markets. In 
fact, however, the D.C. Circuit’s holding rests on its rejection of 
FERC’s finding that demand response resources operate, at least in 
part, within wholesale markets. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that “FERC 
can regulate practices affecting the wholesale market under §§ 205 
and 206, provided the Commission is not directly regulating a matter 
subject to state control, such as the retail market.”178 The D.C. Circuit’s 
interpretation of the statute would have led to the opposite 
conclusion—that FERC’s order was a legitimate exercise of agency 
authority—had the court deferred to FERC’s finding that demand 
response resources operate in wholesale markets, at least in part. 
When the Supreme Court reviews this case, it will probably not 
disregard FERC’s finding outright, but review the finding with proper 
deference under the “substantial evidence” or “arbitrary and 
capricious” standards. Findings by agencies are subject to review, but 
“a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”179 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should overturn the D.C. Circuit and hold 
that FERC acted within its authority when it regulated the wholesale 
rate paid to demand response resources. In doing so, the Court should 
defer to FERC’s interpretation of its jurisdiction under §§ 205 and 
206. Upon identification of an “unjust or unreasonable” rate or 
practice “affecting” the wholesale market, FERC may respond by 
fixing a rate or practice within its traditional jurisdiction or connected 
to the wholesale market, so long as it does not regulate retail sales. 
 
 178.  Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 753 F.3d at 222 (emphasis added). 
 179.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983). 
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FERC will be empowered to take broader actions to correct market 
failures that originate in the retail market or outside of its traditional 
jurisdiction. In addition, the Court will have another opportunity to 
examine deference to agencies and reaffirm the standards of review 
for agency orders and findings. 
